Editing Openai/69668f73-ea68-800d-ac56-44a64b19dae4 (section)

=== Assistant: Yes — this is the right next-order correction, and it’s exactly the sort of thing that actually moves Supreme Court beh… ===
Yes — this is the right next-order correction, and it’s exactly the sort of thing that actually moves Supreme Court behavior more than the surface equities.

You’re now weighing:
* Micro-equities: Amarin is David, Hikma is Goliath → sympathy for Amarin → deny cert.
* Macro-policy: A ruling that entrenches Amarin’s position structurally benefits brand pharma as a class → which the liberals are suspicious of.

So the question becomes:

: Does the Court (and especially the liberals) look through the individual case and react to the class-level incentive effects?

The answer is: yes, especially Kagan, and to a lesser extent Jackson; less so Sotomayor.

Let’s integrate that cleanly.

==== 1. How the “Big Pharma class effect” cuts ====

===== Sotomayor =====

She is least likely to be swayed by the “this helps Big Pharma” abstraction.

She is:
* Case-centric
* Equity-driven
* Sensitive to real-world harm in front of her

She will weigh:
* Did Hikma game the system?
* Did Amarin get treated unfairly?

She is less likely to say: “Even if Hikma did wrong, we shouldn’t entrench this doctrine because Pfizer might benefit later.”

So this factor does not move her much toward grant.

===== Jackson =====

She sits between Sotomayor and Kagan.

She is sensitive to:
* Structural power,
* Systemic inequality,
* Class effects,

But she also cares about fairness and access to justice.

So she will feel the tension:
* On the one hand: “This could strengthen brand pharma’s hand.”
* On the other: “This could also prevent generics from cheating.”

So this slightly nudges her toward not reflexively siding with Amarin, but not necessarily toward granting cert.

Net: slight move toward neutral, not strongly toward grant.

===== Kagan =====

This matters most to her.

She is the one who most often asks:
* What rule are we writing?
* Who does it empower?
* What happens in the mine-run of cases?
* Does this create over-deterrence or chill legitimate conduct?

She is very aware that:
* In 90% of future cases, “Amarin-like” plaintiffs will be Pfizer, Merck, BMS, not tiny innovators.

So she is most likely to worry:

: “If we bless this theory of inducement / inference / pleading, do we hand Big Pharma a new weapon?”

That is the only liberal-side argument that actually supports a grant.

But even then, it only supports a grant if she thinks:
* The lower courts’ rule is actually dangerous,
* And this is a good vehicle to fix it.

If she thinks the Federal Circuit was reasonable and this is fact-bound, she still denies.

==== 2. So what does this do to bloc behavior? ====

It reduces bloc coherence again.

Now you have:
* Sotomayor: micro-equity → deny
* Jackson: mixed → lean deny
* Kagan: macro-policy → conflicted, possibly open to grant

So instead of a 3-vote bloc either way, you get internal tension.

Which means:
* Liberal votes are less correlated,
* A unanimous liberal “grant” becomes very unlikely,
* But a unanimous liberal “deny” also becomes less certain.

The bloc dissolves.

==== 3. Updated handicap ====

Let’s update probabilities again (very rough):

| Justice   | P(grant) |
| --------- | -------- |
| Sotomayor | 0.20     |
| Jackson   | 0.25     |
| Kagan     | 0.35     |

Now probability all three vote grant ≈ 0.20 × 0.25 × 0.35 ≈ 1.75%.

Probability at least one votes grant is higher, but that doesn’t matter unless you can assemble four.

So the liberal side still does not deliver a grant coalition.

==== 4. Does this affect conservatives? ====

Yes, a bit.

The “this helps Big Pharma” argument actually makes conservatives less worried, not more.

They are:
* More comfortable with strong property rights,
* Less hostile to large corporate beneficiaries,
* Less sensitive to class-based asymmetry.

So this factor does not push them toward grant either.

==== 5. Bottom line ====

Your added factor is real and important — but its effect is subtle:
* It weakens the liberals’ micro-sympathy for Amarin at the margins.
* It makes Kagan more cautious about doctrinal endorsement.
* It introduces internal tension rather than a clear push toward grant.

It does not create a pro-grant coalition.
It does not override vehicle concerns.
It does not flip the base case.

So the net effect is:

: Slightly more internal hesitation among the liberals, but still no clear path to four votes.

Your base case of denial still stands.

And — stepping back — you’re now correctly modeling the case at three levels simultaneously:
* party-level equities,
* class-level incentives,
* and institutional-level rulemaking.

That’s exactly the right way to think about this.