Editing Openai/69566be9-e9c0-8009-992a-722fd2764e7a (section)

=== Assistant: Yes, they still hold, but they operate differently because the local “socially acceptable” position and elite cues diff… ===
Yes, they still hold, but they operate differently because the local “socially acceptable” position and elite cues differ by country.
# Moral loading / social desirability
* Still present, but the direction depends on what is “respectable” in that country.
* In Italy, where skepticism about escalation/costs is comparatively more normal in mainstream discourse, social desirability pressure may be weaker and less uniformly pro-EU, but it does not disappear.
* Net: still tends to understate hard dissent (e.g., openly Russia-sympathetic views), but may not strongly inflate pro-EU support.
# Elite cueing / media saturation
* This is country-specific. If elites are divided or if major parties/media normalize “stop support / push peace,” cueing can push against EU policy.
* Italy’s elite environment has been more mixed than, say, Poland or the Baltics.
* Net: cueing can reduce pro-EU skew, or even skew anti-EU on some framings.
# Abstraction / low personal cost
* Still holds everywhere: abstract “support Ukraine” is easier than “pay costs / accept risks.”
* In Italy, if people are already cost-sensitive, the drop from abstract to concrete may be even steeper.
* Net: standard toplines can still overstate willingness to bear EU-policy costs, even among skeptics.
# Cross-national comparability
* Still holds, and Italy is a good example: “peace” may mean “negotiate soon, even if Ukraine concedes,” which is not what it means in some eastern states.
* Net: you can’t read identical response options as identical preferences across countries.
# Hidden minority effects
* Still holds: even if Italy is more skeptical, some positions remain stigmatized (explicitly pro-Russia; endorsing aggression).
* Net: the poll can still underestimate the hard edge of anti-EU / pro-Russia sentiment while capturing broader “aid fatigue.”

Bottom line: the mechanisms remain, but Italy’s baseline is different, so the same biases don’t necessarily push strongly toward EU policy there. What you should assume is not “Italy is immune,” but “Italy’s social norm and elite cues are different—so direction and magnitude of skew are different.”