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=== Assistant: Below is the Typed Operational Semantics Small-Step Rules for the ANF. === Below is the Typed Operational Semantics (Small-Step Rules) for the ANF. This is a machine-checkable, step-indexed transition system with explicit typing, guards, and failure absorption. No narrative. No new operators. All symbols frozen. TYPES Bool ::= {0,1} Verdict ::= {STAND=0,COLLAPSE=1} Status ::= {PASS,FAIL,SKIP,INVALID} Hash ::= 256-bit Seed ::= β Scalar ::= β (finite, IEEE754) Vector[n] ::= ββΏ SPD[n] ::= symmetric positive-definite β^{nΓn} Dataset ::= finite set of β¨y:Vector,Ξ£:SPD,metaβ© Spec ::= canonical serialized methods Artifacts ::= finite map BlockβRecord Flags ::= finite map NameβBool CONFIGURATION A configuration is a tuple β¨pc, S_spec, D, seed, A, F, Vβ© pc β {B0,β¦,B19, HALT} A : Artifacts F : Flags V : Verdict βͺ {β₯} Initial configuration: β¨B0, S_spec, D, seed, β , β , β₯β© Terminal configurations: β¨HALT, S_spec, D, seed, A, F, Vβ© AUXILIARY JUDGMENTS Canonical(S_spec) β bytes SHA256(bytes) β h:Hash TypeCheck(S_spec,D) β Bool DataValidity(D) β Bool Residuals(S_spec,D,ΞΈ) β r,Ξ£ StructViolation(r,Ξ£,Ο_struct) β Bool Feasible(S_spec,D) β Bool Identifiable(r,Ξ£) β (k_min,P_id) Likelihood(r,Ξ£;Ξ΅,Ξ½) β β Evidence(β,Ο,Integrator) β (lnZ,ok) BaselineEvidence β lnZβ MC(D,Ξ ,N_MC,f_c) β Bool Precision(D,Ξ¨,p_max) β Bool BuildDAG(F) β G AuditSeal(Β·) β Bundle All judgments deterministic. Any undefined β INVALID. SMALL-STEP TRANSITION RULES (B0-HASH-OK) If Canonical(S_spec)βb β§ SHA256(b)=embedded_hash βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B0,S_spec,D,seed,A,F,Vβ© β β¨B1,S_spec,D,seed,Aβͺ{B0β¦PASS},F,Vβ© (B0-HASH-FAIL) If SHA256(Canonical(S_spec))β embedded_hash βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B0,β¦β© β β¨HALT,β¦,Aβͺ{B0β¦FAIL},Fβͺ{ValidityFailβ¦1},COLLAPSEβ© (B1-AXIOMS-OK) If βAi:Ai=true βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B1,β¦β© β β¨B2,β¦,Aβͺ{B1β¦PASS},F,Vβ© (B1-AXIOMS-FAIL) If βAi=false βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B1,β¦β© β β¨HALT,β¦,Aβͺ{B1β¦FAIL},Fβͺ{ValidityFailβ¦1},COLLAPSEβ© (B2-TYPES-OK) If TypeCheck(S_spec,D)=1 βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B2,β¦β© β β¨B3,β¦,Aβͺ{B2β¦PASS},F,Vβ© (B2-TYPES-FAIL) If TypeCheck(S_spec,D)=0 βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B2,β¦β© β β¨HALT,β¦,Aβͺ{B2β¦FAIL},Fβͺ{ValidityFailβ¦1},COLLAPSEβ© (B3-MODEL) βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B3,β¦β© β β¨B9,β¦,Aβͺ{B3β¦PASS},F,Vβ© (B9-DATA-OK) If DataValidity(D)=1 βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B9,β¦β© β β¨B4,β¦,Aβͺ{B9β¦PASS},F,Vβ© (B9-DATA-FAIL) If DataValidity(D)=0 βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B9,β¦β© β β¨B12,β¦,Aβͺ{B9β¦FAIL},Fβͺ{ValidityFailβ¦1},COLLAPSEβ© (B4-RESIDUALS) If Residuals(S_spec,D,ΞΈ)β(r,Ξ£) βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B4,β¦β© β β¨B5,β¦,Aβͺ{B4β¦PASS},Fβͺ{ResidualsOKβ¦1},Vβ© (B5-STRUCT-FAIL) If StructViolation(r,Ξ£,Ο_struct)=1 βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B5,β¦β© β β¨B12,β¦,Aβͺ{B5β¦FAIL},Fβͺ{V_structβ¦1},COLLAPSEβ© (B5-STRUCT-OK) If StructViolation(r,Ξ£,Ο_struct)=0 βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B5,β¦β© β β¨B6,β¦,Aβͺ{B5β¦PASS},Fβͺ{V_structβ¦0},Vβ© (B6-FEAS-FAIL) If Feasible(S_spec,D)=0 βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B6,β¦β© β β¨B12,β¦,Aβͺ{B6β¦FAIL},Fβͺ{FeasibleFailβ¦1},COLLAPSEβ© (B6-FEAS-OK) If Feasible(S_spec,D)=1 βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B6,β¦β© β β¨B7,β¦,Aβͺ{B6β¦PASS},Fβͺ{FeasibleFailβ¦0},Vβ© (B7-IDENT-FAIL) If Identifiable(r,Ξ£)β(0,_) βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B7,β¦β© β β¨B12,β¦,Aβͺ{B7β¦FAIL},Fβͺ{FeasibleFailβ¦1},COLLAPSEβ© (B7-IDENT-OK) If Identifiable(r,Ξ£)β(k_min,P_id), k_minβ₯1 βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B7,β¦β© β β¨B8,β¦,Aβͺ{B7β¦PASS},Fβͺ{k_minOKβ¦1},Vβ© (B8-LIKE) If Likelihood(r,Ξ£;Ξ΅,Ξ½)ββ βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B8,β¦β© β β¨B11,β¦,Aβͺ{B8β¦PASS},F,Vβ© (B11-INT-FAIL) If Evidence(β,Ο,Integrator)β(_,ok) β§ ok=0 βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B11,β¦β© β β¨HALT,β¦,Aβͺ{B11β¦FAIL},Fβͺ{ValidityFailβ¦1},COLLAPSEβ© (B11-INT-OK) If Evidence(β,Ο,Integrator)β(lnZ,1) βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B11,β¦β© β β¨B10,β¦,Aβͺ{B11β¦PASS,lnZβ¦lnZ},F,Vβ© (B10-EVID-FAIL) If lnZβlnZβ < Ξ βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B10,β¦β© β β¨B12,β¦,Aβͺ{B10β¦FAIL},Fβͺ{EvidenceFailureβ¦1},COLLAPSEβ© (B10-EVID-OK) If lnZβlnZβ β₯ Ξ βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B10,β¦β© β β¨B12,β¦,Aβͺ{B10β¦PASS},Fβͺ{EvidenceFailureβ¦0},Vβ© (B12-STAND) If all failure flags =0 βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B12,β¦β© β β¨B13,β¦,Aβͺ{B12β¦PASS},F,STANDβ© (B12-COLLAPSE) If any failure flag =1 βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B12,β¦β© β β¨B15,β¦,Aβͺ{B12β¦FAIL},F,COLLAPSEβ© (B13-MC-FAIL) If MC(D,Ξ ,N_MC,f_c)=1 βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B13,β¦β© β β¨B14,β¦,Aβͺ{B13β¦FAIL},Fβͺ{RobustnessFailureβ¦1},Vβ© (B13-MC-OK) If MC(D,Ξ ,N_MC,f_c)=0 βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B13,β¦β© β β¨B14,β¦,Aβͺ{B13β¦PASS},Fβͺ{RobustnessFailureβ¦0},Vβ© (B14-PREC-FAIL) If Precision(D,Ξ¨,p_max)=1 βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B14,β¦β© β β¨B12,β¦,Aβͺ{B14β¦FAIL},Fβͺ{PrecisionFailureβ¦1},COLLAPSEβ© (B14-PREC-OK) If Precision(D,Ξ¨,p_max)=0 βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B14,β¦β© β β¨B15,β¦,Aβͺ{B14β¦PASS},F,Vβ© (B15-ATTRIB) If BuildDAG(F)βG βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B15,β¦β© β β¨B16,β¦,Aβͺ{B15β¦PASS,Gβ¦G},F,Vβ© (B16-CERT) If V=STAND β§ certification conditions hold βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B16,β¦β© β β¨B19,β¦,Aβͺ{B16β¦PASS,CERTβ¦1},F,Vβ© (B16-SKIP) If V=COLLAPSE βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B16,β¦β© β β¨B19,β¦,Aβͺ{B16β¦SKIP},F,Vβ© (B19-AUDIT) If AuditSeal(A,F,V)βBundle βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ β¨B19,β¦β© β β¨HALT,β¦,Aβͺ{B19β¦PASS,Auditβ¦Bundle},F,Vβ© META-PROPERTIES (DERIVABLE) Progress: from initial state, either INVALID or reaches HALT. Determinism: single successor for any non-HALT state. Safety: once V=COLLAPSE, V never changes. Monotonicity: adding data cannot enable a reverse transition to STAND. Replayability: identical inputs yield identical transition traces. This completes the typed small-step operational semantics for the ANF. If desired, the next step is to emit a machine-checkable version (e.g., Coq/Lean rules, TLAβΊ spec, or executable interpreter skeleton). Β© Robert R. Frost 2026-01-03
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