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=== Assistant: === ==== Prospective experience rating ==== * Premium is set in advance for the rating period using expected claims (often credibility-weighted experience, trend, benefit changes, etc.). * Carrier retains favorable results (profit) and bears unfavorable results (loss) during the period. * Simpler to administer; aligns premium with expected cost, but the customer may feel they “overpaid” if experience is good. Retrospective experience rating * Premium is adjusted after the fact (or a refund/dividend is paid) based on actual experience (often with corridors, minimum/maximum, and pooling). * Shares results between carrier and customer; reduces customer’s cost when experience is favorable but also can introduce settlement timing/complexity. * If not symmetric (e.g., refunds on gains but no surcharge on losses), it is effectively a one-sided option granted to the customer. ==== Note: The screenshots do not include the actual net premium and developed claims by year, so I can’t produce numeric totals. Below is the exact calculation method (what a grader expects), which you can apply once the 20X1–20X3 PyP_yPy and CyC_yCy are provided. ==== Let PyP_yPy = net premium in year yyy, CyC_yCy = fully developed claims in year yyy. Target net loss ratio = 96% ⇒ target profit margin = 4%. ===== Profit in year yyy: ===== Πycurrent=Py−Cy\Pi^{\text{current}}_y = P_y - C_yΠycurrent=Py−Cy Total 20X1–20X3: Πcurrent=∑y=20X120X3(Py−Cy)\Pi^{\text{current}} = \sum_{y=20X1}^{20X3} (P_y - C_y)Πcurrent=y=20X1∑20X3(Py−Cy) ===== - “Excess profit” = profit above 4% of premium. ===== * Refund in year yyy: Ry=max(0, (Py−Cy)−0.04Py)=max(0, 0.96Py−Cy)R_y=\max\big(0,\ (P_y-C_y)-0.04P_y\big)=\max\big(0,\ 0.96P_y-C_y\big)Ry=max(0, (Py−Cy)−0.04Py)=max(0, 0.96Py−Cy) * Green’s profit after refund: Πyproposal=(Py−Cy)−Ry=min(Py−Cy, 0.04Py)\Pi^{\text{proposal}}_y = (P_y-C_y)-R_y = \min\big(P_y-C_y,\ 0.04P_y\big)Πyproposal=(Py−Cy)−Ry=min(Py−Cy, 0.04Py) Total 20X1–20X3: Πproposal=∑ymin(Py−Cy, 0.04Py)\Pi^{\text{proposal}}=\sum_{y}\min\big(P_y-C_y,\ 0.04P_y\big)Πproposal=y∑min(Py−Cy, 0.04Py) (Operationally: compute LR each year =Cy/Py=C_y/P_y=Cy/Py. If LR < 96%, cap profit at 4% of premium; if LR ≥ 96%, no refund.) ==== Key concerns: ==== * Asymmetric risk sharing: Green gives away upside when experience is good, but still absorbs full downside when experience is bad. That is equivalent to giving the customer a free call option on results, which reduces expected profit and increases required capital. * Volatility / capital strain: With large groups, random fluctuation is smaller than small groups, but severity risk (shock claim years) remains material; removing upside reduces Green’s ability to offset bad years. * Lapse/anti-selection risk: Groups may stay after good years (collect refunds) and shop/terminate after bad years, worsening Green’s long-run results. * Settlement lag & disputes: Requires fully developed claims and clear definitions (runout, pooling, eligibility changes), increasing administrative burden and the risk of disagreement. * Pricing implication: If offered, the expected cost of the refund feature should be explicitly priced (either via higher premium or explicit risk charge), otherwise target LR will not be achieved. ==== Again, the numeric inputs (annual Py,CyP_y, C_yPy,Cy and the list of claimants ≥$1M by year) are not shown, so below is the required calculation structure. ==== ===== For each year yyy: ===== * Target claims threshold: Ty=0.96PyT_y = 0.96P_yTy=0.96Py * Refund: Ry=max(0, Ty−Cy)R_y=\max(0,\ T_y-C_y)Ry=max(0, Ty−Cy) * Green profit: Πy=min(Py−Cy, 0.04Py)\Pi_y=\min(P_y-C_y,\ 0.04P_y)Πy=min(Py−Cy, 0.04Py) ===== Let high-claimant annual costs be Hy,iH_{y,i}Hy,i for claimants with ≥$1M in claims. ===== * Stop-loss recoveries: Recovy=∑imax(0, Hy,i−1,000,000)\text{Recov}_y=\sum_i \max(0,\ H_{y,i}-1{,}000{,}000)Recovy=i∑max(0, Hy,i−1,000,000) * Net claims after stop loss: CySL=Cy−RecovyC^{\text{SL}}_y = C_y - \text{Recov}_yCySL=Cy−Recovy * Add pool charge cost: Pooly=0.01Py\text{Pool}_y = 0.01P_yPooly=0.01Py * “All-in” cost used for profit sharing: C~y=CySL+Pooly\tilde{C}_y = C^{\text{SL}}_y + \text{Pool}_yC~y=CySL+Pooly Then apply the same profit-sharing rule (96% target unless changed): ΠySL=min(Py−C~y, 0.04Py)\Pi^{\text{SL}}_y = \min\big(P_y-\tilde{C}_y,\ 0.04P_y\big)ΠySL=min(Py−C~y, 0.04Py) Interpretation: lowers volatility by capping severity, but reduces expected profit by the pool charge; net benefit depends on how large Recovy\text{Recov}_yRecovy is relative to 0.01Py0.01P_y0.01Py. ===== This changes the target net LR from 96% to 95%. ===== * Target claims threshold: Ty=0.95PyT_y = 0.95P_yTy=0.95Py * Green profit under proposal becomes: Πy5%=min(Py−Cy, 0.05Py)\Pi^{5\%}_y = \min\big(P_y-C_y,\ 0.05P_y\big)Πy5%=min(Py−Cy, 0.05Py) (If combined with stop loss, replace CyC_yCy with C~y\tilde{C}_yC~y above.) Interpretation: improves Green’s retained upside (higher cap), reduces refund frequency/amount, better compensates for volatility and the “optionality” granted to the group. ===== Define (using target LR 96% unless changed): ===== * Excess profit available for sharing in year yyy: EPy=max(0, 0.96Py−C~y)EP_y=\max(0,\ 0.96P_y-\tilde{C}_y)EPy=max(0, 0.96Py−C~y) * Excess loss above target in year yyy: ELy=max(0, C~y−0.96Py)EL_y=\max(0,\ \tilde{C}_y-0.96P_y)ELy=max(0, C~y−0.96Py) Let fund balance at start of year yyy be Fy−1F_{y-1}Fy−1, with F0=0F_0=0F0=0, cap Fmax=500,000F_{\max}=500{,}000Fmax=500,000. Use fund to offset bad years first: Uy=min(Fy−1, ELy)U_y=\min(F_{y-1},\ EL_y)Uy=min(Fy−1, ELy) Remaining excess loss borne by Green: ELynet=ELy−UyEL^{\text{net}}_y = EL_y - U_yELynet=ELy−Uy Then credit favorable-year share into the fund up to the cap: Deposity=min(EPy, Fmax−(Fy−1−Uy))\text{Deposit}_y = \min(EP_y,\ F_{\max}- (F_{y-1}-U_y))Deposity=min(EPy, Fmax−(Fy−1−Uy)) Any excess beyond filling the fund is distributed: Distributiony=EPy−Deposity\text{Distribution}_y = EP_y - \text{Deposit}_yDistributiony=EPy−Deposity Fund recursion: Fy=min(Fmax, Fy−1−Uy+Deposity)F_y = \min\big(F_{\max},\ F_{y-1}-U_y + \text{Deposit}_y\big)Fy=min(Fmax, Fy−1−Uy+Deposity) Green profit each year (profit-sharing with fund): * Green retains the target margin, less any net excess loss not covered by the fund: Πyfund=0.04Py−ELynet\Pi^{\text{fund}}_y = 0.04P_y - EL^{\text{net}}_yΠyfund=0.04Py−ELynet * If the policy terminates after 20X3, add the retained fund balance as additional profit: Πfund,total=∑yΠyfund+F20X3\Pi^{\text{fund,total}} = \sum_y \Pi^{\text{fund}}_y + F_{20X3}Πfund,total=y∑Πyfund+F20X3 Interpretation: reduces refund payouts in early good years, creates a buffer against future bad years, and (because Green keeps the balance at termination) materially improves Green’s expected value—though it may be viewed as less favorable/less transparent to the customer. ===== 1. Net premium PyP_yPy and developed claims CyC_yCy for 20X1–20X3 ===== # For the stop-loss option: the list of Hy,iH_{y,i}Hy,i (annual claim totals by claimant for those ≥$1M) If you paste those figures, I’ll compute the exact totals and show the full arithmetic.
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