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=== Assistant: Great question — and a useful one for thinking about cases like Amarin v. === Great question — and a useful one for thinking about cases like Amarin v. Hikma / Teva where the Court’s philosophy about patents matters as much as doctrine. Let’s be precise and a little unsentimental about it 🙂 ==== On today’s Court, when people say “the 3 liberal justices,” they usually mean: ==== * Justice Sonia Sotomayor * Justice Elena Kagan * Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson (Justice Jackson is new, so her patent record is thinner; Sotomayor and Kagan are the ones with real history here.) ==== They are generally skeptical of expansive patent rights, especially when those rights: ==== * Impede competition or generic entry * Raise drug prices or consumer costs * Create what they view as “monopoly rents” beyond what innovation strictly requires * Are used aggressively by large corporations rather than individual inventors They are not anti-patent in principle, but they are: : If you want a one-line summary: : That philosophical frame drives almost all of their votes. ==== ### ==== They strongly supported the line of cases that narrowed what is patentable, especially in biotech / diagnostics / software: * Mayo v. Prometheus (2012) — invalidated diagnostic method patents * Alice v. CLS Bank (2014) — invalidated abstract software patents Sotomayor and Kagan were fully on board with tightening eligibility. They tend to view broad eligibility as: * Leading to rent-seeking * Blocking follow-on innovation * Creating litigation instead of progress This has been devastating for parts of biotech and diagnostics — and they have not shown regret about that. ===== They are cautious about strong remedies: ===== * Skeptical of automatic injunctions (eBay v. MercExchange) * Skeptical of large damages awards * Concerned about patent litigation being used strategically or coercively They tend to favor: * Flexible, equitable standards * Limiting leverage of patent holders when it harms competition ===== They are generally: ===== * Pro-generic entry * Anti-“evergreening” strategies * Sensitive to drug pricing and access issues They are often sympathetic to arguments that brand-name pharma overuses patents to extend monopolies. However — and this matters for Amarin — they also care about: * Truthful labeling * Regulatory integrity * Not allowing companies to game the system through deception So their instinct is not “generics always win” — it’s: : ==== ### ==== * Most openly skeptical of patents as monopolies. * Often frames them as market distortions. * Very concerned about access, pricing, and inequality. She is the most likely of the three to vote against patent holders when policy equities are in tension. ===== - Pragmatic, institutionalist. ===== * Cares about administrability, regulatory coherence, and unintended consequences. * Often tries to write “clean” rules even if they limit patent scope. She’s not hostile to patents — she’s hostile to messy or overbroad ones. ===== - Too new to have a deep patent footprint. ===== * But her broader jurisprudence suggests: - Strong pro-consumer instincts - Sensitivity to fairness and power imbalances - Skepticism of large corporate leverage She is likely to align with Sotomayor/Kagan on competition and access. ==== ### ==== You are not in their natural sympathy zone. You are viewed as: * A market incumbent * Exercising state-granted exclusion * Potentially blocking competition So you start with philosophical headwinds. ===== - Protecting truthfulness ===== * Protecting regulatory integrity * Preventing gaming of the system * Preventing consumer deception * Preventing free-riding on innovation without bearing its cost Then you can bring them over — or at least neutralize their skepticism. That’s why in cases like GSK v. Teva and Amarin v. Hikma, the narrative battle matters as much as the doctrinal one. ==== The three liberal justices tend to: ==== | | | | --- | --- | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | They are not anti-innovation, but they are anti-overreach. If you want the blunt version: : That’s the intellectual terrain you’re dealing with.
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