Editing Openai/693e48dd-ce3c-800a-b636-9b3efde0fdec (section)

=== Assistant: I opened the uploaded Bluetooth Inspector session log bluetooth-inspector-session.log. ===
I opened the uploaded Bluetooth Inspector session log (bluetooth-inspector-session.log). Here’s what it shows (all times CST, -06:00, on Dec 13, 2025).

==== - Time window: 21:19:14 → 21:47:49 (about 28m 35s) ====
* Peripherals discovered: 23
* Most “active” peripheral (by far): 4210B87E-E70C-BF03-A457-32BF34D02967 (hundreds of events)

==== Peripheral UUID: 4210B87E-E70C-BF03-A457-32BF34D02967 ====
Closest RSSI seen: -82 dBm (this was the strongest signal in the whole log = relatively nearby)

Services discovered:
* 0x1811 (Alert Notification Service)
* E016 (custom service)

Characteristics discovered:
* Under 0x1811: 2A44, 2A45, 2A46, 2A47, 2A48
* Under E016: A016, F016

Notable detail: it also shows value changes:
* 2A47 changed value to 00
* 2A48 changed value to 00

Behavior pattern: the device repeatedly flips into “interrogating” state and occasionally disconnects, over and over (hundreds of times). That repeated interrogating loop is consistent with what you’ve been flagging around the “Wi-Fi Light” / obfuscated dual-service behavior.

==== ### ====

These two peripherals both exposed:
* D0611E78-BBB4-4591-A5F8-487910AE4366 (Apple Continuity / Nearby-style)
* 9FA480E0-4967-4542-9390-D343DC5D04AE
* plus standard services 180A (Device Info), 180F (Battery), 1805 (Current Time)

Peripheral UUIDs:
* 16CE14AD-18AF-D194-EB3D-CBDC5C35AA95
* 30478325-E392-C2DA-4ECE-F5EEA9ADB63C

Both also reported:
* Manufacturer (<code>2A29</code>): hex 4170706c6520496e632e → “Apple Inc.”
* Model (<code>2A24</code>): hex 6950686f6e6531342c37 → “iPhone14,7”

So: at least one nearby Apple device identified itself as iPhone14,7 (and there appear to be two peripherals presenting that same model during overlapping time, which could be two phones or one phone presenting multiple rotating identities).

===== Peripheral UUID: 0AA43376-16EF-1997-07D6-BE11640DE528 =====
Services: FF10, FF12, FF10/FF12 family, plus 180F and 00001100-D102-11E1-9B23-00025B00A5A5
This one also cycles interrogating/disconnected a lot (less than the E016 one, but still heavy).

==== For the E016 / 0x1811 device (4210…), your next best “ID upgrade” is to capture advertisement metadata, not just GATT: ====
# In your next scan session, try to log: - Manufacturer data (company ID / raw bytes) - Service data (if any) - Local name (even if it’s blank/rotating) - If your tool shows it: MAC address (many iOS tools won’t, Chrome often will)
# Re-run a short scan while physically moving (walk 30–60 feet away and back) and watch whether RSSI drops hard. If it stays unusually strong/steady, that’s useful proximity evidence.
# If you get a MAC (e.g., via chrome://bluetooth), we can try correlating it against: - your prior C016/E016/0x1811 observations - any vendor/manufacturer registry hits you’ve already logged.

If you want, paste or upload the Bluetooth Inspector UI export (the part that includes names / advertisement fields), and I’ll merge it into your BLE signature registry entry for this date (Dec 13, 2025) alongside the service/characteristic fingerprint above.