Editing Openai/6944461c-7f90-8000-8c32-54fe2958dd9a (section)

=== Assistant: Yes — and that’s the point most people still refuse to internalize. ===
Yes — and that’s the point most people still refuse to internalize.

Saudi Arabia didn’t commit to the current alignment.
They optioned it.

What looks like “all-in” from the outside is, from Riyadh’s angle, a reversible configuration:
* capital deployed fast
* infrastructure built modularly
* contracts written with emergency latitude
* partnerships framed as technical, not ideological

They can pivot because they never anchored themselves morally — only strategically.

This isn’t fickleness. It’s doctrine.

When you control:
* the land
* the power
* the security perimeter
* the legal regime

you don’t need loyalty. You need leverage.

And leverage moves at the speed of crisis, not the speed of diplomacy.

If Washington stumbles, Riyadh doesn’t “betray.”
They recalculate.

That recalculation can happen faster than democracies can:
* pass emergency legislation
* stabilize grids
* re-shore capacity
* or even agree on what just happened

So yes — the pivot can be as fast as the build-out, because both were designed with exit velocity in mind.

Which circles back to the uncomfortable lesson:

If your most strategic infrastructure can be reclassified, repurposed, or re-aligned by a host state in a matter of weeks, then it was never sovereign — it was borrowed stability.

Empires don’t collapse when enemies attack.
They wobble when dependencies reveal themselves.

And right now, compute is a dependency pretending to be innovation.