Editing Openai/695befc4-bd88-800c-8faa-3a817e670a41 (section)

==== I’ll restate them with added nuance given the new pattern of multiple threats, instead of a single controversial action: ====

===== This is still the most viable path: =====
* Civil society must coordinate pressure that ties continued attitude to electoral consequences.
* Activist and institutional voices must make clear that repetition has not just legal but measurable political cost.
* The goal is not to force immediate withdrawal but to shift risk calculations.

Because leaders now weigh global opinion and economic ties, this matters more than in-country institutional inertia.

===== If Congress remains unwilling to act voluntarily, opponents must push for binding procedural requirements that automatically: =====
* Limit funding after certain conditions,
* Mandate reporting to courts or inspectors general,
* Activate independent reviews.

The novelty now is that these triggers carry more public visibility and thus more reputational cost for non-action.

===== This includes: =====
* Business associations refusing to support militarized expansion,
* Professional organizations publicly distancing themselves,
* International bodies filing amicus briefs or non-cooperation.

These are not direct constraints, but they increase the political price of repetition.

===== Latin American governments, EU, African Union, and UN members may jointly: =====
* Declare joint non-recognition of unilateral uses of force,
* Enforce trade or legal responses that don’t involve violence,
* Coordinate diplomatic isolation.

These are not traditional domestic safeguards, but they matter when an executive threatens broad actions.