Editing Openai/69256b37-1cac-8004-bb0d-12fcbb764b89 (section)

==== Structural background: ====
* Demography: - UN-based projections: working-age population down ~22% between 2022–2050; growth could lose ~0.5 percentage points annually from demography alone. AMRO Asia<ref>{{cite web|title=AMRO Asia|url=https://amro-asia.org/demography-presents-both-challenges-and-opportunities/|publisher=AMRO Asia|access-date=2025-11-25}}</ref> - By mid-century China will be a significantly older, smaller workforce society relative to its early-21st-century structure. Big Data China<ref>{{cite web|title=Big Data China|url=https://bigdatachina.csis.org/china-is-growing-old-before-it-becomes-rich-does-it-matter/|publisher=Big Data China|access-date=2025-11-25}}</ref>
* Debt & growth model: - Local-government and property-sector stress don’t magically disappear; they either get resolved via painful restructuring or roll forward as zombie liabilities. Atlantic Council<ref>{{cite web|title=Atlantic Council|url=https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/sinographs/chinas-economic-performance-new-numbers-same-overstatement/|publisher=Atlantic Council|access-date=2025-11-25}}</ref>
* Climate and physical risks: - Multiple studies project 2–3× higher exposure to extreme heat and more frequent heavy rainfall events across much of China in the second half of the century, with serious increases already by 2035–2050. Taylor & Francis Online<ref>{{cite web|title=Taylor & Francis Online|url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1674927825000267|publisher=Taylor & Francis Online|access-date=2025-11-25}}</ref>
* Political structure: - If the current trajectory of personalistic, centralized rule persists, succession uncertainty and factional rivalry accumulate in the background.

Bridge360 interpretation (2035–2055):

Here the high-autocracy Politburo template hits its real test:
* Autocracy allows rapid megaprojects (water diversion, climate defenses, industrial pivots) but: - It suppresses error signals from local levels (noisy feedback), - It encourages overconfidence and late course correction, and - It keeps most adaptation “on budget” for elites while shoving entropy “off budget” toward peripheries (rural regions, minorities, external trading partners).

Capability forecast:
'' If the template does ''not* liberalize significantly: - F likely spends long stretches at or above the upper ε-band (e.g. ~0.55–0.65 in your language), - making major systemic episodes (banking/credit crunch, regional social unrest, severe internal lockdowns, or risky foreign ventures) quite probable.
* If there is partial evolution (more transparency, genuine fiscal reform, local autonomy in adaptation): - The system can reconfigure rather than just absorb shocks, pulling F back toward ~0.4–0.5 at times.

Rough Bridge360 reading:
'' Probability that China’s ''current high-autocracy template* keeps fragility in survivable bounds (no regime-level fracture, but possibly deep recessions / regional crises): - ≈40–60% over 2035–2055, - strongly conditional on: - climate events clustering or not, - how succession beyond Xi is handled, - and whether economic policy genuinely shifts from construction/debt to productivity and human capital.

Think of this horizon as “knife-edge navigation”: still possible to stay within the ε-band, but only with active and somewhat self-correcting governance, not just more of the same.