Editing Openai/69566be9-e9c0-8009-992a-722fd2764e7a (section)

== gpt-5-2-thinking ==
=== User: This is, as you can see, a recent YouGov survey. ===
This is, as you can see, a recent YouGov survey. But what is the methodology? Find this answer for me.

=== Assistant: Methodology what YouGov says they do, and what this topline implies: ===
Methodology (what YouGov says they do, and what this topline implies):
* Mode & sampling frame: YouGov runs these as online surveys using its YouGov panel, via what it calls “active sampling”—i.e., only specifically selected, logged-in panel members can take the questionnaire (no open link). YouGov<ref>{{cite web|title=YouGov|url=https://yougov.co.uk/about/panel-methodology|publisher=yougov.co.uk|access-date=2026-01-02}}</ref>
* Recruitment: Panel members are recruited via multiple channels (advertising and partner websites), with socio-demographics recorded at recruitment. YouGov<ref>{{cite web|title=YouGov|url=https://yougov.co.uk/about/panel-methodology|publisher=yougov.co.uk|access-date=2026-01-02}}</ref>
* Weighting / representativeness: After fieldwork, results are weighted to match the national profile of adults 18+ (YouGov explicitly lists weights such as age, gender, social class, region, education; and for “political work” also past vote / referendum vote / political interest—this is described in YouGov’s methodology notes, though the topline itself does not list country-by-country weighting variables). YouGov<ref>{{cite web|title=YouGov|url=https://yougov.co.uk/about/panel-methodology|publisher=yougov.co.uk|access-date=2026-01-02}}</ref>
* Fieldwork window and achieved samples (from your PDF): 8–17 Dec 2025; samples: GB 2083, FR 1106, DE 1101, ES 1002, IT 1011, PL 1144 (weighted = unweighted in the topline table, i.e., same n, not “no weighting”). EPM_Dec2025_Internal_UkraineAnd…

What you cannot get from this particular topline alone: exact weighting targets/variables per country, response rates, question routing details, and full questionnaire scripting. Those would typically be in a separate technical note or dataset documentation—not included in this 5-page topline. EPM_Dec2025_Internal_UkraineAnd…

=== User: Some countries in the poll, like Italy, indicate a sentiment very hostile to the EU policy. ===
Some countries in the poll, like Italy, indicate a sentiment very hostile to the EU policy. Would the points above hold true also for them?

=== Assistant: Yes, they still hold, but they operate differently because the local “socially acceptable” position and elite cues diff… ===
Yes, they still hold, but they operate differently because the local “socially acceptable” position and elite cues differ by country.
# Moral loading / social desirability
* Still present, but the direction depends on what is “respectable” in that country.
* In Italy, where skepticism about escalation/costs is comparatively more normal in mainstream discourse, social desirability pressure may be weaker and less uniformly pro-EU, but it does not disappear.
* Net: still tends to understate hard dissent (e.g., openly Russia-sympathetic views), but may not strongly inflate pro-EU support.
# Elite cueing / media saturation
* This is country-specific. If elites are divided or if major parties/media normalize “stop support / push peace,” cueing can push against EU policy.
* Italy’s elite environment has been more mixed than, say, Poland or the Baltics.
* Net: cueing can reduce pro-EU skew, or even skew anti-EU on some framings.
# Abstraction / low personal cost
* Still holds everywhere: abstract “support Ukraine” is easier than “pay costs / accept risks.”
* In Italy, if people are already cost-sensitive, the drop from abstract to concrete may be even steeper.
* Net: standard toplines can still overstate willingness to bear EU-policy costs, even among skeptics.
# Cross-national comparability
* Still holds, and Italy is a good example: “peace” may mean “negotiate soon, even if Ukraine concedes,” which is not what it means in some eastern states.
* Net: you can’t read identical response options as identical preferences across countries.
# Hidden minority effects
* Still holds: even if Italy is more skeptical, some positions remain stigmatized (explicitly pro-Russia; endorsing aggression).
* Net: the poll can still underestimate the hard edge of anti-EU / pro-Russia sentiment while capturing broader “aid fatigue.”

Bottom line: the mechanisms remain, but Italy’s baseline is different, so the same biases don’t necessarily push strongly toward EU policy there. What you should assume is not “Italy is immune,” but “Italy’s social norm and elite cues are different—so direction and magnitude of skew are different.”

=== User: Exactly. ===
Exactly. Maybe even the elite skewing is against the EU/pro-Zelensky line  in Italy?

=== Assistant: Yes—it is plausible that “elite cueing” in Italy can tilt parts of the public discourse away from the hard pro-aid / pr… ===
Yes—it is plausible that “elite cueing” in Italy can tilt parts of the public discourse away from the hard pro-aid / pro-Zelensky line, but it’s not a clean anti-EU tilt.

What the Italian elite signal environment looks like (late 2025):
* Government line (Meloni + Tajani/Forza Italia): institutionally pro-Ukraine and aligned with EU/NATO; Italy just approved extending military aid through 2026 (with coalition tensions managed via “more defensive/logistics/civilian-use” emphasis). Reuters<ref>{{cite web|title=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/italy-backs-ukraine-military-aid-through-2026-after-coalition-clash-2025-12-29/|publisher=reuters.com|access-date=2026-01-02}}</ref>
* Coalition split (League/Salvini): visible skepticism about further aid and stronger emphasis on “peace/stop escalation” arguments; this creates a high-profile elite cue against maximalist support. Reuters<ref>{{cite web|title=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/italy-backs-ukraine-military-aid-through-2026-after-coalition-clash-2025-12-29/|publisher=reuters.com|access-date=2026-01-02}}</ref>
* Parliamentary reality: Italy has repeatedly renewed authorizations for aid, but with non-trivial opposition and division—i.e., elite cues are not one-directional. The Kyiv Independent<ref>{{cite web|title=The Kyiv Independent|url=https://kyivindependent.com/italian-parliament-approves-extension-of-military-assistance-to-ukraine-in-2025/|publisher=The Kyiv Independent|access-date=2026-01-02}}</ref>
* Public mood backdrop: Italy is comparatively more skeptical than many EU countries about “more aid” (example: Security Radar 2025 reports only 42% support further aid, 34% oppose). Peace Foundation<ref>{{cite web|title=Peace Foundation|url=https://peace.fes.de/security-radar-2025/country-profiles/italy.html|publisher=Peace Foundation|access-date=2026-01-02}}</ref>

So, on your question: elite cueing in Italy can plausibly skew against the EU’s harder line on some items (especially “continue weapons vs push negotiations”), because prominent elites give permission to dissent. But the state’s official line remains pro-Ukraine, so you should expect mixed cues rather than a uniform “elite bias against EU policy.”

Recent Italy–Ukraine aid coverageReutersItaly backs Ukraine military aid through 2026 after coalition clashsiku 3 zilizopita<ref>{{cite web|title=ReutersItaly backs Ukraine military aid through 2026 after coalition clashsiku 3 zilizopita|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/italy-backs-ukraine-military-aid-through-2026-after-coalition-clash-2025-12-29/|publisher=ReutersItaly backs Ukraine military aid through 2026 after coalition clashsiku 3 zilizopita|access-date=2026-01-02}}</ref>ReutersItalian parliament gives final approval to government's 2026 budgetjuzi<ref>{{cite web|title=ReutersItalian parliament gives final approval to government's 2026 budgetjuzi|url=https://www.reuters.com/business/italian-parliament-gives-final-approval-governments-2026-budget-2025-12-30/|publisher=ReutersItalian parliament gives final approval to government's 2026 budgetjuzi|access-date=2026-01-02}}</ref>

=== User: The most important question in the survey is: ===
The most important question in the survey is: 
A:Support Ukraine in its efforts against Russia until such a time that Russia withdraws from the country
B: To encourage a negotiated peace to end the fighting, even if this means Russia still has control over some parts of Ukraine. 

Would you categorise the EU elite policy as A or B ?

=== Assistant: Closer to A. ===
Closer to A.

EU “elite policy” (European Council / EEAS) is: support Ukraine and insist on a “just and lasting peace” consistent with Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and Russia’s withdrawal—i.e., not “peace even if Russia keeps territory” as a target outcome. Consilium<ref>{{cite web|title=Consilium|url=https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/standwithukraine_en|publisher=eeas.europa.eu|access-date=2026-01-02}}</ref>

Important nuance: the EU supports negotiations only on Ukraine’s terms / with Ukraine, and frames them around territorial integrity; that’s not your option B, which normalizes territorial retention by Russia. Consilium<ref>{{cite web|title=Consilium|url=https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/12/19/european-council-conclusions-on-ukraine/|publisher=consilium.europa.eu|date=2024-12-19|access-date=2026-01-02}}</ref>